












Abstract:  This paper surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural 
protection. A detailed data set of agricultural PAC (Political Action Committee) contributions 
over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period is used to investigate 
the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical 
analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are 
very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. 
Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively 
associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the US; there is a strong 
association between the average US tariff on goods that benefit from US export subsidies and 
lobbying spending; and no association between agricultural protection and trade measures 
such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.  
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1.   Introduction 
While many empirical studies, surveyed subsequently in this paper, have investigated and 
affirmed the role played by lobbies in influencing farm policy, especially in the United States, 
few have examined the structure of lobbying at a level of detail sufficient to reveal patterns 
about who lobbies, who are lobbied, and whether lobbies accomplish their goal of influencing 
policy.  The objective of the paper is to fill this shortcoming in the literature.   
As we will see, the term lobby takes on different meanings depending on the 
theoretical context.  Thus, informational lobbying means just that – providing information 
rather than money, while quid pro quo lobbying implies an exchange of money for services in 
the form of favorable policy.  The paper also presents direct and indirect evidence on whether 
agricultural lobbying in the US is better characterized as informational or quid pro quo 
lobbying. 
Multilateral negotiations that seek to implement freer trade in agriculture must 
recognize the political-economic nexus that has led to continuous subsidization and protection 
of agriculture in developed countries, for example in the U.S. since the 1930s. To the extent 
that lobbies significantly influence agricultural policy, implementing freer trade in agriculture 
requires designing incentive schemes that take into account the status quo political-economic 
equilibrium.  Accomplishing free trade in agriculture requires effective bargaining at the level 
of diplomacy.  Effective bargaining at that level must be performed over policy options that 
are politically viable domestically, since governments must serve their constituencies first.  
And governments do listen to their politically active constituents disparately more than others. 
Despite the fact that agriculture accounted for less than 5% of GDP and employment 
in developed countries, the farm trade dispute held up the Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
Agricultural protection was virtually ignored in the first four rounds, by design due to the 
sector’s political sensitivity. Even regional trade agreements routinely exclude agricultural 
products, without which the agreement might not succeed. The task of multilaterally 
negotiating reductions in agricultural protection in the Doha round is therefore a challenging 
one. The extent of trade liberalization in agriculture is already being used as a barometer for 
the Round’s success.  To this end, with the objective of designing implementable agreements 
in mind, this paper investigates lobbying and its role in influencing the structure of 
agricultural protection in the U.S.   
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The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 three theoretical classes of political 
economy models that have gained currency in the literature are described in detail.  Evidence 
about their validity accompanies their description.  This existing empirical literature on the 
political economy of agricultural protection also provides a flavor for the econometric models 
and data used in this literature.  Section 3 graphically analyzes detailed data on lobbying 
spending by agricultural PACs during 1991-2000.  In Section 4 an econometric model is 
estimated in order to explore the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural 
protection. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.   Political Economy Models: A Literature Survey of Theory and Evidence 
De Gorter and Swinnen (2002) provide a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural policies in the developed world.   
The main body of their survey focuses on three approaches: the Becker-Olson-Stigler model 
of collective action by lobbies (Becker, 1983, Olson, 1965, and Stigler, 1971); politician-voter 
interaction models in the tradition of Downs (1957); and the Stigler-Peltzman approach that 
places different weights on different members of society in the government’s objective 
function (termed the “revealed preference” approach by de Gorter and Swinnen).   
This paper’s motivation is the same as de Gorter and Swinnen’s. They state this aptly 
(p 1903): “Understanding why governments do as they do allows one to analyze the policy 
formation process and alter incentive constraints through institutional reform in order to 
achieve desired policy outcomes” (italics mine). While their survey has gone into depth about 
the agricultural economics literature on political economy, they do not take into account 
important and relevant developments outside the agricultural economics literature. The aim of 
this paper is to complement the de Gorter and Swinnen survey with an analytic survey of 
recent models about pressure groups that has begun to receive attention in the literature. Of 
specific interest is the debate over two schools of thought about how those pressure groups 
operate. One set of models emphasizes that pressure groups lobby by paying for services, 
while the other set of models maintains  that pressure groups seek to informationally lobby 
policymakers, and money primarily buys access but not the policy itself.  It is hoped that the 
analysis in this paper informs that debate in the context of agricultural policy. We begin with  
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an analytic survey of three types of models, all of the special interest or pressure group 
variety.   
 
A.    Olson-Peltzman-Stigler Interest Groups  
Anderson (1992) sets out a unified framework to explain two stylized facts about agricultural 
protection: (i) special interests matter, and (ii) both developed and developing countries 
protect their agriculture, but trade barriers are far higher in developed countries. Anderson’s 
political economy model, built on the foundations of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), and 
Peltzman (1976), supposes that the government supplies (positive or negative) price support 
policies
2 for the sector in response to demand for such assistance by vested interests, mainly 
farmers. Figure 1 depicts this partial equilibrium model. The price in this political market is 
political support for the government in the form of lobbying contributions to electoral 
campaigns (other forms of political support could be used as well). The negatively sloped 
demand curve (e.g. Ddc) represents the marginal willingness of farmers to pay (WTP) for 
increased assistance.  The WTP declines as the amount of assistance increases because more 
assistance encourages entry of new firms, spreads the benefits over more firms, and worsens 
the free-rider problem of collective lobbying action by the group.  The positively sloped 
supply curve (e.g. Sdc) represents the marginal political cost to the government of providing 
assistance.  This cost increases with the amount of support as greater intervention causes 
greater welfare losses, thus weakening electoral support from adversely affected consumers.  
The quantity of assistance is measured as the effective protection coefficient (the EPC 
is the percentage by which policy has raised value-added) for agriculture relative to the 
average EPC for other sectors of the economy.  In Figure 1 equilibrium in developed 
countries (dc) occurs at a quantity greater than one, indicating that agriculture receives more 
protection on average than other sectors.  Equilibrium in developing countries occurs at a 
quantity less than one, indicating that agriculture is discouraged relative to other sectors.   
                                                 
2 The quantity of assistance may be measured variously by the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) 
which measures the difference between world and domestic prices as a result of the price support, the 
effective protection coefficient (EPC) which measures the amount by which the policy raises value 
added, or producer/ consumer subsidy equivalent (PSE, CSE) which measures the monetary benefit to 
producers/consumers as a result of the policy as a percentage of production value in the absence of the 
subsidy.  
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This policy disparity between developed and developing countries has been well 
documented in the literature. According to Anderson this disparity is due do dissimilar 
distributional effects of policy intervention in these two types of economies, as well as 
differences in the relative costs of collective action by interest groups.  If capital, including 
land, is sector-specific and labor is mobile, the distributional effects of a policy that alters 
farm prices is determined by (i) its impact on wage costs and (ii) the share of the expenditure 
on food. In a poor agrarian economy raising the relative price of agricultural products can 
substantially raise wage rates by increasing labor demand in the labor-intensive agricultural 
sector. This substantially lowers the income of owners of land and industrial capital.  
Together with the high costs of lobbying organization (farms are small and farmers numerous, 
making the free rider problem insurmountable) this makes for weak demand for farm price 
support policies relative to demand for policies that support the industrial sector. The demand 
and supply curves in political markets in developing countries therefore intersect towards the 
lower left in Figure 1.  
In rich industrial economies, farmers are a small proportion of the labor force. Raising 
the relative price of farm products has little impact on the demand for labor and consequently 
wages. Counter lobbying by consumers is thus not an issue. Further, since people spend a 
small part of their income on farm products they are less sensitive to an increase in farm price. 
As a result, the supply curve in industrial economies is far to the right of that in developing 
countries in Figure 1.   The demand curve lies to the right as well. Farms are large, and the 
stakes from price support policies are high. Institutionally commercialization of agriculture 
has given rise to cooperatives, which has also reduced the free-rider problem of political 
organization in this sector.  
A simulation exercise by Anderson (1994) suggests that an increase in the relative 
price of farm products would raise farm owner-operators’ real incomes in the typical poor 
country by only one-tenth as much as it would reduce the real incomes of industrial 
capitalists, while a similar price policy shock in the typical rich country raises farmers’ real 












Figure 1: The political market for government assistance to agriculture 
 
Moreover, the real incomes of non-farm workers would be lowered by four times as 
much in the poor as in the rich country.  They would be more inclined to join industrialists in 
opposing price support policies in a poor than in a rich country. Even poor countries with a 
wealthy landed aristocracy are likely to adopt policies that discriminate against agriculture, 
since landowners typically are also to some extent industrial capitalists. Anderson’s 
simulation exercise suggests that if landlords earned as little as one-sixth of their income from 
industrial capital they would prefer policies which lowered the domestic price of farm relative 
to industrial products. This helps explain why Krueger (1990b) found agriculture to be only 
slightly less discriminated against in those developing countries with concentrated land 
ownership as compared with those with a more even distribution of land. 
Other authors have put forth various extensions of the pressure group model to explain 
agricultural price policy. Swinnen and de Gorter (1994) and Swinnen (1994) develop 
politician voter models, building on a combination of Stigler (1971), Downs (1957), and de 
Gorter and Tsur (1991).  Their main conclusion can be summarized in five testable 
propositions put forth in Swinnen (1994) (and tested in Olper, 1998, see below): (i) politicians 
increase agricultural subsidies as real agricultural income falls, (ii) the equilibrium subsidy 
increases as a share of agriculture in total output decreases, (iii) the equilibrium subsidy 
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subsidy increases as supply elasticity increases, and (v) demand elasticities influence the 
subsidy for large importers and exporters. 
  Empirical evidence about agricultural protection using the framework of Anderson 
(1992), Anderson and Hayami (1986), and Swinnen (1994) is plentiful.  Two studies that 
employ cross-country agricultural protection data are summarized here, leaving discussion of 
U.S. studies for the following section.  Olper (1998) employs a reduced form econometric 
model to explain the structure of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) transfers in eight 
countries in the European Union.  He considers effective and nominal protection rates in these 
eight countries annually over 1975-1989. The explanatory variables are (loosely) motivated 
by (i) the pressure group model of Becker (1983, 1985) and Olson (1965), (ii) extensions of 
the model of voter-politician interactions by de Gorter and Tsur (1991) and Swinnen (1994) 
and de Gorter and Swinnen (1994), and (iii) the model of altruism by Bullock (1994). Olper’s 
panel regression estimates yield three findings. First, agricultural protection increases under 
adverse market conditions for the farming industry supporting the counter-cyclical hypotheses 
of Bullock.  Second, countries with comparative disadvantage in agriculture enjoy greater 
protection in agriculture supporting the view that Stolper-Samuelson effects motivate losers 
from liberalization to organize politically.  Third, a high budget share for food consumption 
reduces protection perhaps indicating government’s concern for welfare losses from 
protection.  In sum, both, special interests as well as government concern for welfare 
determine the structure of CAP transfers. 
Honma (1993) empirically investigates whether Japan’s agricultural protection is 
determined according to the Anderson-Hayami (1986) framework of endogenous protection.  
The dependent variable in his regression is a nominal protection coefficient (NPC) measured 
as the ratio of the value of agricultural output in domestic prices to its value in border prices. 
Its log represents a rate of difference between the output valued in domestic and border prices. 
Using panel data on 14 industrial countries between 1955-1987 Honma finds that (i) NPC 
declines with comparative advantage in agriculture (measured as the ratio of labor 
productivity in agriculture to labor productivity in industry), (ii) there is inverted-U shaped 
relationship between the NPC and the share of agriculture in output (or employment), with a 
threshold value of that share equal to 4.5%; that is, NPC rises as the share in agriculture 
increases to 4.5% and falls beyond that, (iii) NPC increases as the terms of trade (measured as  
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ratio of the index of world export unit value of agricultural products to the export unit value 
index of manufactured goods), decline in agriculture, and (iv) region specific dummies 
indicate that European Union and other non-aligned European countries had a far higher 
growth in NPC than either Japan, the Asian new industrializing economies, or the U.S. 
Honma concludes that as economies reach advanced stages of development the political 
environment favors protection in the agricultural sector for two reasons. First, the relative 
contraction of agriculture in the total economy reduces the consumers’ resistance to 
agricultural protection. Second, the contraction of agriculture leads to greater concentration 
and therefore makes political lobbying by farmers more efficient. On Japanese protection, 
Honma concludes that while the pre-1975 growth in the NPC was largely due to changes in 
comparative advantage, after 1975 the main determinant was the declining terms of trade 
against Japanese agriculture.  
While the ideas present in the next two classes of models have existed informally in 
the literature over many years, only recently have they been modeled using well defined 
objective functions and solved formally in order to investigate the properties of the 
equilibrium solutions. The first class of models takes the position that both lobbyists and 
decision-makers in policy view lobbying as essentially providing information. Money plays 
the secondary, though important, role of buying access to policymaker.  This theory of 
lobbying, originally developed in Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963) and Milbraith (1960), has 
received formal treatment in Ainsworth and Sened (1993), Austen-Smith (1995, 1995), 
Bennedsen and Feldman (2002) and Wright (1990).  Hansen (1991) finds the theory of 
informational lobbying relevant and applicable to U.S. agricultural policy over this century.  
The second class of models considers lobbying as a means of buying favorable policy, not 
merely access.  This view is most effectively put forth in Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
 
B.   Informational Lobbying 
Ainsworth and Sened (1993) offer a sophisticated non-exchange based rationale for the 
emergence of lobbies. Their thinking is that lobbies endogenously emerge whenever there is 
uncertainty on the part of politicians about the true demand for the public goods which they 
have the power to provide.  Thus the focus is on the informational role that lobbies provide.  
Lobbies endogenously form since their existence improves the efficiency of the interaction  
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between government and particular interests, by providing information more economically 
than it would pay government to obtain the same information by itself. Of course, lobbies are 
not able to provide exact information about the true demand, only signals. But these signals 
enable the elimination of inefficient equilibria.  Essentially, lobbies are able to create surplus 
due to such informational efficiencies, which politicians and lobbies share and are left better 
off.  Perhaps, this model is appropriate for explaining the boom in the number of lobbies that 
are issue-based such as green lobbies.  The theory is difficult to test since it offers few clues 
about what the “reduced-form” function for (some measure of) lobbying might look like.  
A case is strongly made for the relevance of informational lobbying in Hansen’s 
(1991) study of the politics of U.S. agricultural support policies.  His informal, yet intuitive, 
theory is based on his observations about the interactions between Congress and the farm 
lobby over the period 1919-1981. The theory is designed to explain three stylized facts about 
how the farm lobby gained and lost access to Congress over this period.  
•  In the 1950s and 1960s, farm policy makers dropped the American Farm Bureau 
Federation (AFBF) from its dominant position in agricultural politics. AFBF had been 
agriculture’s leviathan for a generation.  In the 1960s and the 1970s commodity 
organizations replaced the position previously occupied by the AFBF.  
•  In the 1960s and the 1970s farm policy makers paid less and less attention to the advice of 
farm lobbies. 
•  In the 1970s and 1980s, this was reversed, and they scarcely paid attention to the advice of 
consumer lobby.  
In sum, during those 40 years, Congress reallocated access within the farm lobby, 
Congress restricted access for the farm lobby but Congress denied access to the consumer 
lobby. Hansen develops a theory to explain these changes in access. His theory is developed 
around  (i) competitive advantage in a lobby’s ability to deliver better information to 
politicians than their rival groups, and (ii) recurrence of issues around which a lobby makes 
its case to the politicians. Hence, politicians grant access to lobbies on the basis of their 
informational advantage over other lobbies, and also the permanence of the issues and 
positions conveyed by the lobbies. Hansen’s theory of access is based not so much on the 
direct monetary contributions by lobbies as on their informational contributions. In his view,  
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money does not cause votes, information does. Hansen finds his theory provides satisfactory 
explanations of the three observations made above. 
  Austen-Smith (1993) focuses on lobbying committee members in order to influence 
their votes as well as shape the committee’s agenda.  In this model lobbying is the mechanism 
for transmitting strategic information from interest groups to committee members.  Austen-
Smith finds support for his theory in Hansen’s finding that there was widespread transmission 
of information from the farm lobby to the agricultural committee, in spite of (or perhaps 
because of) the fact that lobbyist preferences over issues like price supports were opposed to 
those of the House as a whole.  
Austen-Smith (1995) develops a model of access via campaign contributions, where 
the role of lobbying is primarily to reveal to the policymaker the policy preferences of the 
lobbyist.  To put this model in the context of agricultural policy, consider a hypothetical 
example.  While it is common knowledge that agriculture will be scrutinized in the coming 
legislative session it is not clear exactly whether issues such as price supports will consume 
the agenda.  Thus lobbyists pay to purchase the option to speak to the legislator should such 
an opportunity arise.  In this model money exchanges hands before details of the legislative 
agenda are revealed. The sequence of steps in this game are as follows. First, the group 
chooses its contribution; next, it is probabilistically determined whether the issue is relevant 
to the group; next, if the issue is relevant (else the game ends), then the legislator chooses 
whether to grant access; next, if access is granted the group makes it’s lobbying speech and 
the legislator makes a decision (otherwise the legislator makes a decision without granting 
access) and the payoff is distributed.  Austen-Smith’s model is able to theoretically explain 
the strong positive correlation between lobbying contributions and the preference similarity 
between the lobby and the legislators that these lobbies woo (or negative correlation between 
contributions and preference disparity).   
Kollman (1997) finds such a positive empirical correlation.  More precisely, he finds a 
strong correlation between the preference biases of lobbyists and committee members who 
they lobby.  On the issue of whether this is a causal relationship (as postulated by Austen-
Smith) or a correlation due to common preference biases of legislators and lobbyists that 
brings them together, Kollman opts for the latter.   
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Bennedsen and Feldman (2002) extend these models of informational lobbying with a 
single decision maker, to address the fact that ultimately the purpose of lobbying is to 
influence legislation, which is made by Congress.  Hence, any complete theory of 
informational lobbying must take into account the process by which majorities are formed 
during legislation of policy.   They develop a theory whose main conclusion is that the ability 
to create majorities in Congress provides the necessary incentives to lobby groups to carry out 
their activities. 
The findings in Wright (1990) empirically motivate the relevance of the Bennedsen-
Feldman model.  Wright conducted a survey of lobbies that had contacted Ways and Means 
committee members and Agriculture committee members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  His inference that money contributions plus informational lobbying 
influenced voting in Ways and Means affirms the first view that informational lobbying does 
matter.  Further, Wright found that lobbying mattered more than money to Ways and Means 
committee members (that is, money bought access in order to informationally lobby).  
Wright’s findings about lobbying of Ways and Means member have two implications: (i) 
taking note of the fact that decisions are made not individually but in committees of the 
Congress, rather than target one individual lobbyists allocate their scarce resources over a set 
of influential decision makers, and (ii) lobbying is informational. The Bennedsen-Feldman 
contribution is thus more relevant than previous theoretical models that presumed 
informational lobbying of an individual decision maker. 
Notably, Wright finds very weak evidence of informational lobbying of the House 
Agriculture committee, the most influential policymaking committee in agriculture.  The 
specific content of the five-yearly Farm bills are determined in this committee.  In Wright’s 
data strong collinearity among regressors precluded reliable inferences about informational 
lobbying of the Agriculture committee.  Wright attributes the weak finding to the fact that the 
Agriculture committee deals with a narrow and well defined set of issues on a periodic basis 
(as different from Ways and Means which attacks a range of diverse issues, often on an ad 
hoc basis). Both, leaders and rank and file members of the Agriculture committee, have ample 
opportunity to regularly interact with lobbies.  The preferences of these lobbies have been 
fairly constant over time, and so those preferences are well known to Agriculture committee 
members (as different from Ways and Means whose members encounter a variety of  
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lobbyists, often on an issue-by-issue basis, so that informational lobbying by those lobbies is 
influential on the margin).  Hence, informational lobbying of Agriculture committee members 
is not influential on the margin in the formation of coalitions. 
This view of Agriculture committee members possessing a strong continuing link with 
PACs, whose preferences have been stable over time, is endorsed in Parker and Parker (1998).   
They factor-analyze data on voting within committees, where leadership is less partisan and 
more attuned to the issues and lobbying interests surrounding those issues, versus voting on 
related issues after those issues have left the committee for the floor, where floor leaders are 
more partisan and seek to establish coalitions based on party and ideology.  Parker and 
Parker’s aim is to differentiate committees in the House in which voting by their members do 
not change as issues move from committee to the floor from committees in which voting does 
change. Agriculture and Ways and Means are the two highest ranked in terms of the stability 
of coalitions as their issues move from committee to the floor.
3 Parker and Parker take this to 
imply that the influence of special interests on forming preferences of committee members on 
these committees is strong.  In other committees, members often change their votes on the 
floor, indicating that their preferences while serving on committees were weak to begin with. 
In sum, evidence on the relevance and effectiveness of informational lobbying, at least 
in the context of agricultural policy, is an open issue and deserves further investigation.  
Hansen finds for informational lobbying, while Parker and Parker do not. Hansen’s is a long-
term exercise and identifies threshold points in time during which legislators sought better 
information because they recognized it to be marginally effective in increasing electoral 
strength. Shorter run studies do not find this to be the case. 
 
C.    Quid Pro Quo Lobbying 
In contrast to Hansen (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1994) put forth a theory of how policy 
responds to lobbying contributions. In their model, money causes votes and is the source of 
electoral strength. A stylized fact that supports this view is that lobbying contributions 
account for a significant share, up to 80%, of a congress person’s total campaign 
                                                 




4  With soft money playing a bigger role in recent years, this proportion has 
increased on average.  Among the models of special interest that have been advanced in 
political economy, the GH model yields the sharpest testable conclusions. 
The Grossman-Helpman model is a small open economy model.  A numeraire good is 
produced using only labor, which fixes wage. n goods are produced using CRS technology 
with labor and sector-specific capital.  Trade policy is quantified in the domestic price vector 
p. An import tariff or export subsidy on good i raises pi above the world market price πi. 
Conversely, an import subsidy or export tax on good i lowers pi below the world market price 
πi.  Net government revenues are redistributed on a lump-sum basis. Individuals in the 
economy differ only in their ownership of sector-specific factors. Each individual owns 
specific capital in at most one sector, and the total supply of specific capital in any sector is 
inelastic.  Hence, the reward to sector-specific input in good i is increasing in pi.   
Government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and lobbying contributions (free 
trade would be the efficient outcome if government maximized only welfare). Capital owners 
in some sectors L organize into interest groups in order to attempt to influence government’s 
policy.  Through lobbying contributions, the lobby representing sector i aims to increase pi, 
and/or decrease prices of other goods (since individual lobby members consume other goods, 
decreasing their price raises welfare of lobby members).
5 Lobby i offers government 
contingent campaign contributions Ci(p), conditional on the trade policy p that the 
government chooses.  Grossman and Helpman model the lobbying game as a menu auction. 
After the lobbies submit their contingent contribution schedules, the government sets trade 
policy p.  In a pure menu auction, every lobby makes a menu of offers to the government (the 
menu may, and probably will, comprise zero contributions corresponding to subsets of the 
policy space), and government auctions policy to highest bidder.  A pure menu auction would 
be the case if the government were interested purely in contributions and not on welfare. In 
the Grossman-Helpman model government maximizes a weighted sum of campaign 
contributions C and gross welfare W: 
                                                 
4  My own observation after perusing a number of congressional profiles between 1980 and 2000 
comprehensively summarized by Congressional Quarterly in their “Politics in America” volumes.  
 
5  Either that is the case or the output of other industries is used as intermediate inputs by industry i, or 
both.   
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G = aW+C.                ( 1 )  
 
Thus, the Grossman-Helpman model is more than a pure menu auction model, and is better 
described as a common agency model where lobbies are the principals and government is the 
common agent. The common agency problem has been formulated and solved by Bernheim 
and Whinston (1986).   
  On the lobbying side, Grossman and Helpman posit that equilibrium lobbying 
contribution schedules (i.e. the menus they offer the government) are the result of lobbying 
competition, and determined in a Nash equilibrium.  In deciding their menus, every lobby 
takes into consideration the maximization of (1) by the government.  Take the example of an 
economy with just one lobby, say, in sector 1.  With negligible membership relative to the 
population lobby 1 is interested purely in p1 and would like the government to set it above the 
world price π1. The lobby submits a menu of offers given by its contribution schedule C1(p1), 
which is in turn determined by the maximization of the sum of the individual members’ 
welfare functions, Σi∈L Wi(pi).
6 The government can choose either to set p1 at a level above the 
world price, and collect the contribution associated with that level, or ignore the lobby and 
collect zero contribution.  Let G* denote the value of the political welfare function if p1= π1. 
In order to obtain a more favorable policy, lobby 1 must ensure the government a political 
welfare of at least G*.  That is, it must compensate the government to the extent of the 
welfare loss from protecting sector 1.  But the lobby gets to keep any and all surplus (the 
aggregate change in the welfare of each member net of contributions). When there is more 
than one lobby, there is lobbying competition and lobbies may have to contribute beyond the 
welfare loss to the government.   









































,     (2) 
                                                 
6 The individual welfare functions comprise three components: producer profits, consumer surplus, 
and tariff revenue. Since individuals maximize quasi-linear utility functions with desirable properties, 
the expression for consumer surplus is simple. See Grossman and Helpman (1994) eq. (4).  
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where ti=(pi−πi)/pi is the ad valorem tariff or export subsidy for good i in equilibrium, Ii is an 
indicator variable that equals one if sector i is organized into a lobby. The parameter α≤1 is 
the fraction of the population organized into lobbies.  a>0 is the government preference 
parameter in (1), and indicates the weight government places on a dollar of welfare relative to 
a dollar of political contributions. zi=xi/mi is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to 
imports and ei is the absolute elasticity of import demand.
7  If sector i is a net importer then it 
is protected (ti>0) or obtains an import subsidy (ti<0) depending on whether it is organized 
(Ii>0) or not (Ii<0).   
(2) may be interpreted as follows. The second component on the right hand side of (2) 
indicates that protection to organized sectors is given according to their z/e ratios. Since 
deadweight loss from protection is higher in industries with high import elasticities the 
government is averse to protecting these industries, all else equal.  z measures the stakes from 
protection, and industries with high z values will make larger lobbying contributions.  The 
lower the import volume, the lower the social cost imposed on individuals, thus diluting their 
opposition to protection of that sector.  The first component on the right hand side of (2) 
indicates that negative protection to unorganized industries is given according to their z/e 
ratios. α measures the extent of opposition to protection. If only a negligible fraction were 
organized into lobbies, α=0, then there would be no organized opposition to protecting any 
sector (only organized support for protecting a lobby’s own sector).  If everyone were 
organized, α=1, then organized lobbying for protection in any sector would be balanced out 
by organized opposition to that protection, and tariffs would be zero.  
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) have 
empirically investigated these predictions using U.S. manufacturing industry data, Mitra, 
Thomakos and Ulubasolglu (2002) with Turkish data and McCalman (2002) with Australian 
data.  They affirm the predictions qualitatively. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay also examine 
the lobbying side of the Grossman-Helpman model.  They affirm the fundamental prediction 
                                                 
7 The Ramsey pricing logic applies here. The Ramsey tax formula implies that if the demand for a 
good is uniformly less elastic than that for another good, the optimal tax rate is higher for the first 
good due to the lower deadweight loss from taxing it rather than the second good. If the first good is 
totally inelastic there is no deadweight loss from taxing it, and the first best can be reached by taxing 
just this good.   
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that contributions increase with deadweight loss from protection. Further, lobbying spending 
rises with the share of an industry’s output that is used by politically organized downstream 
industries.  
Gardner’s (1987) work on explaining agricultural protection pre-dates the Grossman-
Helpman model but is prescient about the key features of the Grossman-Helpman model.  In 
Gardner’s model government maximizes the weighted sum of buyer’s surplus (B) and 
producer’s rents (R) which are functions of farm output quantities, W = B + θR.  Efficient 
redistribution using production controls in this framework
8 requires choosing quantities of 
farm products to maximize W.  Unlike Grossman and Helpman, who adopt a formal model of 
the lobbying process and, as a result, are able to provide micro-foundations for their objective 
function, Gardner does not provide micro-foundations for W.  However, he uses Peltzman’s 
(1976) “majority generating function” as the argument for using this type of objective 
function.  He attributes the same forces that determine lobbying effectiveness as determining 
the value of the parameter θ.  Specifically, Gardner measures these forces for seventeen farm 
commodity by the number of producers, their geographical dispersion, the stakes from 
redistribution (output per farm), and the stability of the industry (variability of production 
patterns).  He also estimates (long-run) demand and supply elasticities for those commodities.   
Pooling data across the seventeen commodities over the period 1912-1980 yields a 
sample of 1124 observations for Gardner’s empirical analysis.  The dependent variables 
measuring intervention differ across different commodities, but are variants of the nominal 
protection coefficient.  Gardner finds that the lower (greater) the (inverse) demand elasticity, 
the greater the level of intervention, that is, the higher the price relative to it’s non-distorted 
price.  This is a confirmation of the Grossman-Helpman intuition that it is most efficient to tax 
commodities with the lowest price elasticities of demand, and is the basis for Gardner’s 
conclusion that interventions in U.S. agriculture have been efficient.  
From the coefficients of other explanatory variables, Gardner finds strong support for 
the political economy model view of price supports in U.S. He finds: an inverse-U 
relationship between the number of producers and producer protection; that geographical 
concentration leads to greater protection; prolonged concentration of production in a few 
                                                 
8  Deadweight loss, as in the Grossman-Helpman model, has no normative implications given the 
objective function, and represents the real resource cost of redistributive services.  
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states increases protection; protection decreases in farm income and as prices improve; 
imported commodities receive greater price supports; the greater the share of output exported, 
the greater the amount of price support.  All these coefficients support some political 
economy model, though the precise connection is not made formally clear and the connection 
of the variables to any underlying theory is tenuous. Regardless, the collective evidence in 
favor of the influence of special interest is impressive.
9 
The next two sections contain the empirical contribution of this paper. Data on the 
structure of lobbying by agricultural political action committees (PACs) is merged with data 
on agricultural protection in order investigate evidence of direct association between the two. 
The models discussed above all indicate that lobbying matters, whether lobbying involves 
money in exchange for favorable policy or whether it involves provision of information that is 
mutually beneficial to the lobbyist and policymaker.  The detailed graphical analysis of the 
structure of lobbying spending undertaken in the next section does inform the debate about 
whether lobbying in the US agricultural sector is informational or of a quid-pro-quo nature.  
The formal econometric analysis that follows, however, does not distinguish between the two 
types of lobbying.  Rather, it is motivated by the need to make the association between 
lobbying and protection explicit.  
 
3. Graphical  Analysis  of  PAC Contributions 1991-2000 
A. Data 
Raw lobbying data for the five congressional election cycles (for the 103
rd through 106
th 
Congress) between 1991-2000 were downloaded from the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) website (www.fec.org). The data are in three relational data files: candidate 
information files (CN), PAC committee information files (CM), and files containing 
transactions between PACs and candidates (PAS).  For each election cycle, aggregate 
contributions by each PAC to every candidate were computed from the PAS files, and then 
                                                 
9   While the three sets of models described up to this point emphasized varying degrees of pressure by 
farm interest groups, Paarlberg (1989) believes that they do not provide a complete understanding of 
U.S. agricultural policy to data.  What these theories miss, according to Paarlberg, is the government’s 
concern for poor economic conditions in the sector.  Such concerns motivated Roosevelt’s 
introduction of price support programs via the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  Those price 
supports are integral to U.S. agricultural policy to this day. 
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merged with the relevant cycle’s CN  files. The House and Senate files were separated for 
each cycle.  Congressional committee and sub-committee assignments for each Congress 
were obtained from Congressional Quarterly (1991-1999).   
  Mapping from PACs to SIC-based agricultural-related sector makes use of the 
concordance by Beaulieu and Magee (2002).
10 In general the mapping is many-PACs-to-
many-SIC-codes.  For many-to-one maps, the contributions were simply aggregated for each 
SIC code. For one-to-many maps, political contributions from each PAC were fractionally 
assigned equally to each SIC code into which the PAC mapped. To check the consistency of 
the PAC data, they were compared with the data on the opensecrets.com website.  Our data 
are very comparable in the aggregate, as well as those sectors for which opensecrets.com does 
report data. 
 
B.  PAC Spending Across Agriculture-Related Sectors 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of PAC contributions by 2-digit SIC agriculture-related sectors 
in the 1991-92 election cycle (first bar) and the 1999-2000 cycle (second bar).  The striking 
feature here is that the contributions have held fairly steady over the ten-year period. It 
appears that the same PACs have contributed fairly predictable amounts of money over this 
period.  Rather than use the 2-digit descriptions, subsequent figures break down farm PACs 
by seven  products—wheat, dairy, sugar, vegetables and fruits, cotton, ranch and other. Figure 
3 depicts the total contribution by agriculture-related sectors for each of the five election 
cycles between 1991 and 2000. In order to compare farm PAC contributions with other 
agricultural related sectors, Figure 3 also shows contributions by PACs in the following major 
sectors: Farm Equipment, Agricultural Services, Crop Processing Services, Distribution, 
Forestry/Nursery, and Food Manufactures. 
Farm PACs contributed between $5.5 mn. and $7 mn. during each of those five 
election cycles. Among farm products the most politically active were sugar PACs, dairy 
PACs and ranch PACs. Together these three PACS accounted for about 75% of total farm 
PAC contributions 
11. 
                                                 
10 I am grateful to Chris Magee for making this available. 
11 By comparison agriculture related non-farm PACs contributed between $9 and $10 mn. per cycle 
during this period. Food manufacturing PACs, Forestry-Nursery PACs, Agriculture Services PACs 
and Distribution PACs were even more active in absolute terms than Farm PACs.   18
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Table1:  Herfindahl Index: 1991- 2000 
    1992 1994 1996 1998 2000    Average 
Wheat  0.326   0.301   0.336   0.294   0.329   0.317  
Dairy  0.333   0.320   0.287   0.329   0.384     0.331  
Sugar  0.127   0.164   0.134   0.140   0.121     0.137  
Vege  0.099   0.084   0.076   0.084   0.065     0.082  
Cotton  0.340   0.411   0.296   0.364   0.363     0.355  
Ranch  0.143   0.154   0.144   0.152   0.152     0.149  
Other  0.127   0.149   0.141   0.114   0.099     0.126  
Equip  0.593   0.603   0.463   0.479   0.538     0.535  
Ag Services  0.121   0.113   0.104   0.130   0.143     0.122  
Crop Processing  0.986   1.000   0.976   0.893   0.901     0.951  
Distribution  0.136   0.110   0.154   0.165   0.132     0.139  
Forest/Nursery  0.077   0.059   0.060   0.075   0.073     0.069  
Manuf  0.083   0.105   0.071   0.073   0.073     0.081  
4-PAC Concentration Ratio 1991 - 2000 
   1992  1994  1996  1998  2000   Average  
 Wheat  0.956   0.942   0.892   0.950   0.939     0.936  
 Dairy  0.866   0.881   0.863   0.835   0.843     0.858  
 Sugar  0.646   0.676   0.655   0.652   0.620     0.650  
 Vege  0.527   0.512   0.469   0.495   0.401     0.481  
 Cotton  0.953   0.948   0.887   0.899   0.897     0.917  
 Farm  0.704   0.673   0.601   0.644   0.639     0.652  
 Other  0.611   0.597   0.676   0.569   0.503     0.591  
 Equipment   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000     1.000  
 Ag Services  0.608   0.573   0.523   0.590   0.610     0.581  
 Crop Processing   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000     1.000  
 Distribution  0.633   0.551   0.690   0.694   0.642     0.642  
 Forest/Nursery  0.464   0.371   0.377   0.437   0.445     0.419  
 Manuf  0.513   0.465   0.456   0.458   0.451     0.469  
 
How many PACs are active in the agriculture and related sectors? Our database 
indicates over 200 PACs that were politically active during this period. Table 1 indicates the 
“market structure” of PACs in the political market place. Among farm PACs, cotton, dairy 
and wheat had the highest degree of PAC concentration. The four PAC concentration ratio in 
the lower panel of Table 1 shows that wheat and cotton farms were represented politically 
almost entirely by four PACs. Even dairy, ranch and sugar had high levels of PAC  
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concentration. The inverse of the Herfindahl indices represents the number of equal-sized 
PACs that are active in each sector. Hence, cotton, dairy and wheat each had the equivalent of 
three to four equal sized PACs representing them politically. Ranch, sugar, and fruits and 
vegetables were represented by the equivalent of eight to ten PACs 
12. 
One message is that a high degree of concentration among PACs does not translate 
unconditionally into high PAC spending. For example, wheat PACs are highly concentrated 
yet their spending is small (see Gardner (1996), and below). Therefore, beyond organization, 
the stakes from favorable policy appear to be an important determinant of PAC spending.  
An instructive case study of the influence of PAC money is that of the sugar lobby. 
Brooks, Cameron and Carter (1998) estimate a simultaneous model of voting on Sugar 
legislation and PAC contributions. Their objective is to investigate whether PAC 
contributions influence congressional voting and whether influencing congressional voting is 
a motivation for how PACs target their limited PAC spending. They find that during 
legislation of the 1985 and 1990 House sugar votes (the 1985 House amendment was to lower 
the loan rate by 1 cent per year until it reached 15 cents per pound, which was defeated 142 – 
263, and the 1990 House amendment was to lower the loan rate on sugar from 18 cents per 
pound to 16 cents per pound until 1995 which was defeated 150 – 271): 
(i)  Both votes were responsive to sugar PAC contributions as well as counter lobbying by 
sweetener user PAC contributions. Further, the value of sugar production in their 
constituency also determined voting. Surprisingly, committee membership and ideology 
(party, which is shown to be a crucial variable in voting is excluded from the voting 
equation) appear to play no part in those house votes.  
(ii) Sugar lobbying contributions targeted those with a high propensity to be pro sugar. The 
number of sugar farms in the recipients’ district is an important determinant of sugar PAC 
contributions. Committee membership is statistically significant determinant of lobbying 
spending by sugar PACs (but the signs on the committee dummy reverse from 1985 to 
1990). 
                                                 
12 By comparison, Food Manufacturing and Forestry and Nursery had lower degree of concentration, 
while crop processing had the highest degree of concentration. (Cargill, Inc almost singularly 
represents Crop processing.) 
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(iii) An interesting feature of this study is a third equation for counter lobbying by sweetener 
users. Committee membership, ideology, and party all play a role in 1990 but counter 
lobbying in 1985 is poorly explained by the variables included.  
The 1990 sugar vote in the senate was responsive to, both, lobbying by sugar PACs 
and counter lobbying by sweetener PACs. The value of sugar production in the state was a 
statistically significant explanatory variable. The sugar PACs contributions targeted senators 
with a propensity to vote pro sugar. and targeted democrats and senators with seniority. 
Interestingly, lobbying competition from sweetener users increased sugar PAC contributions. 
Surprisingly, committee did not appear to matter. Counter lobbying by sweetener users 
largely responded by lobbying sugar PAC contributors. The main message from this result is 
that lobbying competition did play a role in the 1990 senate sugar vote. 
Wheat, on the other hand, provides a case study of a sector that is politically not very 
strong, but has nevertheless managed to obtain subsidies. The persistence of these export 
subsidies via the costly and ineffective Export Enhancement Program (EEP) is analyzed in 
Gardner (1996).  The political economy of the EEP is best viewed as organized pressure 
groups (wheat producers, other grain producers, wheat exporters) that stood to gain 
considerably from the EEP, winning at the expense of unorganized consumers and domestic 
grain domestic grain processors who lost between $250-600 mn. annually. Another group that 
gained considerably were foreign governments, the buyers of subsidized wheat.  Alternative 
policies that would have left the economy better off were politically less appealing.  Gardner 
observes that in order for alternative policies to have a chance of succeeding politically, 
farmers must first buy into them, since the agricultural committees take their cue first and 
foremost from the farmers.  If farmers are united, only organized public opposition can sway 
politicians.  Such opposition has been absent for food subsidies in general, and the EEP in 
particular.  Gardner also emphasizes the role played by other institutional features in 
maintaining the longevity of the EEP.  The Office of Management and Budget designates EEP 
as budget-neutral because of large government stocks of wheat (in the past decade these 
stocks have depleted considerably).   
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C.  PAC Spending Across Policymakers 
Ultimately, politicians deliver favorable policy. Thus, PAC spending may be directed at either 
putting into office politicians who have a high probability of delivering favorable policy, or 
gaining access to politicians who have influence over policy, or both. Whether PAC money 
influences election outcomes has been the subject of the number of studies. The results are 
mixed at best. The consensus in the literature seems to be shifting in the direction of PAC 
spending either as an instrument to gain access or as quid pro quo payments for policy.  
Figure 4 breaks down contributions by party and chamber.
13 Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of agricultural PAC contributions across candidates for the House and Senate 
over the five election cycles. Contributions to House and Senate candidates are further broken 
down by party. In the 1991-92 and the 1992-94 election cycles, two-thirds of agricultural 
PAC contributions went to House candidates and one-third to Senate candidates. Among 
House candidates Republicans and Democrats received almost equal contributions. Among 
Senate candidates Ag PACs appear to favor Republicans.  
This picture changed dramatically during the 1995-96 election cycle. Total Ag PAC 
contributions were 15% greater than the previous cycle. Republican candidates for House and 
Senate seats got the lion’s share of those contributions. Ag PACs thus appeared to facilitate 
the eventual Republican majority in both the House and Senate, the first time in decades that 
the Republicans enjoyed majorities in both houses. It would be tempting to conclude that Ag 
PAC money was able to influence electoral outcomes, a view that goes against the grain in the 
literature. In anticipation of Republican majorities in the House and Senate led agricultural 
PACs (and most other corporate PACs) to contribute heavily to Republicans. Republicans 
were viewed as pro-business and to be more likely providers of favorable policy than 
democrats. Ag PAC contributions in the 1997-98 and the 1999-00 election cycles continued to 
have a Republican skew, though total contributions declined from the 1995-96 levels. 
                                                 
13 Agricultural PACs are defined as related to all the agriculturally related sectors depicted in Figure 3. 
They include Farm products, Ranch PACs, Ag Services, Crop Processing, Distribution, Forestry-
Nursery, Farm Equipment and Manufacturing.   
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Figures 5-9 detail whom agricultural PACs target politically.  They present a break 
down of agricultural PAC money in each election cycle by individual House and Senate 
recipients.  In each election cycle, in the two chambers the top 20 recipients of Ag PAC 
money are named, their Ag PAC receipts indicated, their party, state and, importantly, their 
membership (if any) to the Agricultural committee and its subcommittees are indicated.  
Figure 5 shows the top 20 House recipients of Ag PAC money during the 1991-92 
election cycle. A striking feature is the presence of many House Agriculture committee 
members on this list. In the 1991-92 Agriculture committee there were 45 seats (27 
Democrats, 18 Republicans). Of these, fifteen appeared in the top-20 list. The 1991-92 
Agriculture committee comprised eight subcommittees. 
14 The Agriculture chair (de la Garza ) 
and three committee chairs (Huckaby, Stenholm, Rose) were on the top-20 list. This pattern of 
giving to candidates strongly suggests that Ag PAC money sought influence. Ag PACs clearly 
targeted members of the Agriculture committee, specifically those wielding influence over 
agriculture policy.  The amounts themselves are not inconsequential. For many candidates on 
the top-20 list Ag PACs are a major source of campaign contributions. Figure 10 indicates 
that contribution from Ag PACs delivered anywhere between 8% (Fazio) and 60% (de la 
Garza) of the total PAC money received by candidates in this “Ag PAC top 20”. 
15 It is thus 
not unlikely that the Ag PAC money may have played a role in influencing election outcomes. 
Figure 11 similarly shows that the top 20 recipients of Ag PAC contributions during the 1999-
00 election cycle got significant shares of their total PAC contributions from Ag PACs. 
                                                 
 
14 During 1991-92, the House Agriculture subcommittees were: Conservation, Credit and Rural 
Development (CCRD), Cotton, Rice and Sugar (CRS), Department Operations, Research and Foreign 
Agriculture (DORFA), Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition (DMCRN), Forest, 
Family Farms and Energy (FFFE), Livestock, Dairy and Poultry (LDP), Peanuts and Tobacco (PT), 
Wheat, Soybeans and Feed Grains (WSFG). The 1993-94 subcommittees were Department Operations 
and Nutrition (DON), Environment, Credit and Rural Development (ECRD), Foreign Agriculture and 
Hunger (FAH), General Farm Commodities (GFC), Livestock (L), and Specialty Crops and Natural 
Resources (SCNR). House subcommittees in 1995-96 and 1997-98 were Department Operations, 
Nutrition and Foreign Agriculture (DONFA), GFC, Livestock, Dairy and Poultry (LDP), Risk 
Management and Specialty Crops (RMSC), Resource Conservation, Research and Forestry (RCRF). 
1999-00 subcommittees were Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition and Forestry (DOONF), 
General Farm Commodities, Resource Conservation and Credit (GFCRCC), Livestock and 
Horticulture (LH), Risk Management, Research and Specialty Crops (RMRSC). 
  
15 The total receipts were generally higher because the candidates received not just from PACs but also 
from individuals.   
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Whether agricultural PAC money influenced electoral outcomes is left as an open issue 
deserving further research. 
Returning to Figure 5.1 it should be noted that there are candidates on this top 20 Ag 
money list who are not members of Ag committee (Fazio, Edmondson, Bliley, Bonior and 
Anthony).  However, they were all (with the possible exception of Anthony) from 
congressional districts with influential agricultural constituents (CA, OK, VA, MI). For 
example, Fazio’s district (CA, district 3) was among the 30 leading congressional districts by 
market value of agricultural products sold in 1997 (1997 Census of Agriculture), and 
Edmondson’s district was among the thirty leading Cattle and Calves districts  
Finally, contribution to Ag committee members, and membership on Ag committees 
are not independent of each other. The received wisdom in the literature on the political 
economy of agriculture policy is that representatives from districts with agriculturally 
influential constituencies seek out membership on agriculture committees and lobby hard for 
positions of influence on its subcommittees.  Consequently, they are in position to influence 
agriculture policy especially during the five-yearly Farm Bill legislations. Their influential 
positions endear them to PAC influence. Ag PAC contributions and the ability to influence 
agriculture policy are therefore simultaneously determined.  
Figures 5.2–5.5 depict the top-20 Ag PAC list from the four election cycles between 
1993 and 2000. They reinforce the foregoing observations. In each of these cycles, giving to 
members of the House agriculture committee is highlighted. And candidates who appear in 
the list but are not members of the agriculture committee belong to districts with 
agriculturally influential constituencies.  
An interesting pattern emerges when comparing the combination of party with 
committee membership across the five election cycles.  A natural experiment that the cycles 
provide is the switch from Democratic to Republican majority in 1995 and thereafter. 
Whereas, the top-20 recipients who were agriculture committee members comprise largely 
Democrats during the 1991-92 and 1993-94 congresses, they were mainly Republicans in the 
three later congresses. This pattern reinforces the view that Ag PAC money was not party 
driven (or ideological) but rather sought influence.   
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Fi gure 5. 1: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC m oney: 1991- 92 El ect i on Cycl e
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Fi gur e 5. 2: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC money: 1993- 94 El ect i on Cycl e
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Fi gur e 5. 3: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC money: 1995- 96 El ect i on Cycl e
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Fi gur e 5. 4: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC money: 1997- 98 El ect i on Cycl e
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Fi gur e 5. 5: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC money: 1990- 00 El ect i on Cycl e
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The pattern of giving to Senate candidates appears to be very similar to the pattern of 
giving to candidates up for House elections.  That is, candidates on the top-20 Ag PAC Senate 
list get roughly similar contributions as do candidates on the top-20 Ag PAC House list. 
Hence, Ag PACs view these top-20 senators and representatives approximately equally. If the 
theory that contributions are made in exchange for political favors is correct, then Ag PACs 
view senators as having as much power to provide political favors as do representatives. If the 
theory that contributions mainly target access to political influence is correct, then Ag PACs 
view senators and representatives approximately equally in the amount of influence each 
dollar of contributions is likely to buy. This quantity of influence, in turn, depends on the 
provision of information to politicians that is perceived by them to be both, costly and 
valuable.  
One important difference between Ag PAC contributions to Senate and House 
candidates is that Ag PAC contributions to Senate candidates as a percentage of their total 
PAC receipts do not exceed 25% and is generally lower than 10% even for the largest 
recipients of Ag PAC contributions. This is not surprising since, on average a Senate election 
costs roughly ten times as much as a house election
16.  This is depicted in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 
for the House and in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for the Senate. However, the evidence that Ag PACs 
view senators and representatives equally while making campaign contributions appears to be 
fairly strong evidence that Ag PACs do not generally seek to influence election outcomes. If 
influencing elections were the true motive, then we should see Ag PAC receipts as a   
proportion of total PAC receipts to be roughly similar across House and Senate candidates. 
But this implies that contribution to Senate candidates should be ten times higher than they 
actually are.
                                                 
16 In 1992 the average winning Senate candidate spent $3.9 mn. while the average House winning 
candidate spent $0.5 mn., approximately an 8:1 ratio,.  The average Senate loser spent $2.0 mn. while 
the average House loser spent $.2 mn., a 10:1 ratio. In other election cycles the average Senate to 
House spending ratios (winners plus losers) 10:1 in 1994, 8:1 in 1996, 9.4:1 in 1998, 10:1 in 2000.  
Further, total PAC receipts as a proportion of total campaign spending averaged approximately 20% 
for winning Senate candidates while they averaged approximately 50% for winning House candidates.  
These figures are computed from in formation on the opensecrets.org (opensecrets 2002) web site.   
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Fi gur e 6. 1: Top 20 House AG PAC Reci pi ent s: Rat i o of  AG PAC t o Tot al  PAC r eci ept s,  1991- 92
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Figures 7.1-7.5 name the Senate candidates that were the largest recipients of Ag PAC 
money over the five election cycles between 1991-00, and indicate the amounts they received. 
It is instructive to compare Figure 7.1 with its House counterpart, Figure 5.1.  The amount of 
Ag PAC money received by Senate candidates (Figure 7.1) is approximately of the same 
magnitude as that received by House candidates (Figure 5.1) on average.  However, there are 
distinct differences in the characteristics of these top-20 Ag PAC recipients. Many more 
members of the Agriculture committee appear on the House top-20 Ag PAC list in Figure 5, 
while relatively fewer in number appear on the Senate top-20 Ag PAC list in Figure 7.1
17.  
Indeed, in the 1993-94 election cycle (Figure 7.2) only two of the top-20 Ag PAC senate 
recipients belong to the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry committee. During 
enactment of 1995 Farm Bill the top-20 Ag PAC list comprised many more senators from 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry committee as Figure 7.3 clearly indicates. Nonchalance 
about committee membership returned in the next two election cycles with fewer committee 
members on the top-20 Ag Pac lists of Senate candidates during those cycles (Figure 7.4 and 
7.5).   
The overall message is that membership on the Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 
committee did not confer especially great benefits upon Senators. It accords well with the 
generally held view that committee membership matters more to congressmen in the House 
than in the Senate. The opportunity for vote trading and logrolling is greater in the Senate than 
in the House. Senators, regardless of their committee affiliations, have greater individual 
influence over legislation than do Representatives, who derive their power from memberships 
                                                 
17 The Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry committee is smaller than the House Agriculture 
committee. It comprises eighteen senators (in 1991-92 the party ratio was 10 Democrats to 8 
Republicans).  This is about two-fifths the size of the House Agriculture committee. During 1991-92, 
the following Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry subcommittees were formed:  Conservation , 
Credit and Rural development (CCRD), Cotton, Rice and Sugar (CRS), Department Operations, 
Research and Foreign Agriculture (DORFA), Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition 
(DMCRN), Forests, Family Farms and Energy (FFFE), Livestock, Dairy and Poultry (LDP),  Peanuts, 
and Tobacco (PT), Wheat, Soybeans and Feed Grains (WSFG). At the beginning of every new 
congress the entire subcommittee structure is significantly altered. In the 1993-94 the sub committees 
were: Agricultural Credit (AC), Agricultural Production and Stabilization of Prices (APSP), 
Agricultural Research, Conservation, Forestry and General Liquidation (ARCFGL), Domestic and 
Foreign Marketing and Product Promotion (DFMPP)Nutrition and Investigations (NI) and Rural 
Development and Rural Electrification (RDRE).The subcommittees in 1995-96, 1997-98 and 1999-00 
were: Forestry, Conservation and Rural Revitalization (FCRR), Marketing, Inspection and Product 
Promotion (MIPP), Production and Price Competitiveness (PPC), and Research, Nutrition and General 
Legislation (RNGL).  
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on influential committees such as the House Agriculture committee. Therefore, the top-20 
Senate Ag PAC lists in Figures 7.1-7.5 contain names of Senators who are from states with 
influential agricultural constituencies but may or may not be members of the Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry committee. A case in point is the absence of the chair of this committee 
in 1991-92 (Sen. Leahy, VT, ranked 33
rd among Ag PAC recipients), but the presence of 
Senators from Missouri which was the 12
th ranked state in 1992 according to market value of 
agricultural products sold (U.S. Department of Census, 1997), Wisconsin, ranked 8
th, 
Oklahoma ranked 17
th, Indiana ranked 11
th, Arkansas ranked 13
th, Pennsylvania ranked 18
th, 
and Georgia ranked 19
th. Senators from other states appearing in Figure 7.1 but not ranked 
highly according to total value of agricultural products sold were nevertheless ranked highly 
in output of specialized products. Thus, Senators were sought by: potato interests in Idaho, 
tobacco and livestock interests in Kentucky, peanut and poultry interests in Alabama, tobacco 
interests in South Carolina.   
Nor does it appear that there was a strong desire among senators to become members 
of agriculture committees. Representing states with strong agriculture interests was sufficient 
to guarantee them Ag PAC money. This was especially true among the top-20 Ag PAC 
Senate recipients in the 1993-94 (Figure 7.2), 1997-98(Figure 7.4) and 1999-00 (Figure 7.5) 
election cycles.  Figure 7.2 for example indicates that agriculturally rich states represented by 
strong Ag PACs (Texas, Montana, Washington, California) gave to their Senate candidates 
regardless of committee membership. The same was true of the 1997-98 and 1999-00 election 
cycles. A reasonable conclusion is that there does not appear to be simultaneity between the 
amount of PAC spending and committee membership.  Evidence of that simultaneity appears 
to be much stronger for House candidates.  
  37
Fi gure 7. 1:  Top 20 SENATE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC Money.  1991- 92 El ect i on Cycl e.
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D  ND  [ AG:  DFMPP,  Chai r  AC, APSP]  -  CONRAD
R  DC  CHANDLER
R  W I   KAST EN
R   D C   [A G : A P S P , N I, A R G L] - D O LE
R   IA   [A G : A C ,  A P S P , D F M P P ] - G R A S S LE Y
R  OK  NI CKLES
R  I N  COATS
D  KY  FORD
D  SD  [ AG:  AC,   RDRE,  Chai r  ARGL]  -  DASCHLE
D  AR  BUMPERS
R  I D  KEMPTHORNE
R  PA  SPECT ER
R  AZ  MCCAI N
D  AL  SHELBY
R  GA  COVERDELL
D  LA  BREAUX
D  SC  HOLLI NGS 
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Fi gure 7. 2:  Top 20 SENATE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC Money.  1993- 94 El ect i on Cycl e.
$0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000 $250,000 $300,000
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R  VT    JEFFORDS
R  DE    ROTH 
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Fi gure 7. 3:  Top 20 SENATE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC Money.  1995- 96 El ect i on Cycl e.
$0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000 $250,000 $300,000
R   O R     S M ITH
R  VA  [ AG:  Chai r  FCRR, RNGL]   CRAI G
R   N C   [A G :F C R R ,C hair M IP P ,P P C ]  H E LM S
R  CO    ALLARD
R  KY  [ AG: MI PP, Chai r  RNGL]   MCCONNELL
R   V A   [A G :F C R R ,P P C ]  W A R N E R
R   M N     B O S C H W ITZ
R  AL    SESSI ONS
R  DC    DOLE
R  TN    THO M P S O N
D  SD    JOHNSON
R   M S   [A G :M IP P ,C hair P P C ]  C O C H R A N
D  DC  [ AG: RNGL, FCRR]   HARKI N
R   O K     IN H O F E
R  NJ    ZI MMER
D   M T  [A G :M IP P , P P C ]  B A U C U S
R  I A    LI GHT FOOT
R  SD    PRESSLER
R   TX  [A G :]  G R A M M
D  I L    DURBI N 
  40
Fi gure 7. 4:  Top 20 SENATE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC Money.  1997- 98 El ect i on Cycl e.
$0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000 $250,000 $300,000
R   G A    [A G : F C R R , C hair M IP P ]  C O V E R D E LL
R   N C     F A IR C LO TH
R   M O     B O N D
R   IA   [A G : F C R R , P P C ]  G R A S S LE Y
R  CA    FONG
D   A R     LIN C O LN
D  SD  [ AG:  FCRR,  PPC]   DASCHLE
R   K Y     B U N N IN G
R   IL    FITZG E R A LD
R  NV    ENSI GN
R   C O     C A M P B E LL
D  LA    BREAUX
R  DC  [AG Chai r]  LUGAR
R  AL    SHELBY
R   O H     V O IN O V IC H
R   ID     C R A P O
R  OK    NI CKLES
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R  KS    BROW NBACK
R  NY    D' AMATO 
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Fi gure 7. 5:  Top 20 SENATE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC Money.  1999- 00 El ect i on Cycl e.
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  However, the study by Van Doren, Hoag and Field (1999) finds that committee 
membership does confer benefits to Senators. They compute PAC spending by sub-sectors of 
agriculture during 1989–94 with the objective of studying what characteristics of Senators 
influence the pattern of contributions. They find membership on the Senate Agriculture 
Committee and the Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies sub-committee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee to be the most important determinant.  Membership on 
the Senate Agriculture committee confers the ability to receive $13,000 more in agricultural 
PAC contributions, and membership on the Appropriations Sub-committee confers an 
advantage of over $4,000.  Some agricultural sub-sectors contribute far more to committee 
members than do others. The study also finds that while the average legislator only received 
about 7% of his or her PAC funding from Ag PACs, agricultural committee members receive 
almost 14% of their PAC funding from Ag PACs. Of all the sub sectors, food manufacturing 
valued membership to agricultural PACs the most, paying on average $2,332 per year to 
committee members. Next in line were sugar cane and sugar beet producer PACs, at $1,617, 
followed by agricultural services at $1,288. Membership to Agriculture Appropriations sub 
committee also mattered, leading to an aggregate annual contribution of $4,215 more than 
non-members.  Agricultural services PACs were the leaders in this category, paying on 
average $1,094 more, followed by dairy PACs at $ 891. Van Doren et al. also find the 
percentage of state under farmland to be a consistent indicator of PAC contributions.  Thus 
with every 1% increase in % farmland, holding everything else constant, the senator from that 
state could expect to get $124 more per year. Sugar cane and sugar beet ($27) and tobacco 
($22) were the highest payers. Dairy producers came in third at $18.   
While their estimates are statistically significant, the effects are small relative to the 
total campaign contribution these committee members receive. The lobbying data we have 
analyzed suggests that a similar exercise for House Agriculture committee members would 
show committee-effects that are not only statistically significant, but also economically large. 
  To close, it is pertinent to ask whether informational lobbying might not be a useful 
alternative to the quid-pro-quo lobbying of the Grossman-Helpman model.  It has been well 
documented, for example in Parker and Parker (1998) that congresspersons and lobbies 
interact continually on agricultural issues. Congresspersons have full knowledge about their 
constituents’ preference, which is why they seek out memberships on agriculture committees.  
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There is little, if any, new information that congresspersons seek from lobbies in order to raise 
their re-election chances.  And there is little, if any, new information that agriculture lobbies 
possess.  At least in the agriculture case, then, we do not see a role for informational lobbying.  
Our experiment is different from Hansen’s (1991), who does find an important role for 
informational lobbying.  He considers a longer period in history during which there were 
points in time when Congress sought new information from lobbies.  At those threshold 
points, informational lobbying may have led to marked shifts in how Congress began to view 
agricultural policy. However, on a continuing basis over the 1991-2000 period we see little 
role for new information. 
In the empirical section a reduced form approach is used to explore the association 
between lobbying spending and agricultural protection.  This is the first evidence on such an 
association in the case of agriculture, and the nature of the exercise and the evidence is 
exploratory.  The main message is evidence of a strong association.  Whether the association 
is via informational channels or whether lobbying is payment for services are questions that 
are not directly addressed, for they require more theory-based investigation. Gawande and 
Hoekman (2004) undertake one such examination of the quid pro quo hypotheses. Perhaps, 
other second generation studies will use more formal structural models to investigate the 
relative importance of informational versus quid pro quo lobbying in the context of US 
agricultural policy.  
 
4. Econometric  Evidence 
A. Data 
Econometric evidence on the association between lobbying spending and protection in 
agriculture is presented in this section, using panel data for 44 commodities across 1985-2001. 
The USDA’s Production, Supply and Distribution database PSD Online (at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/complete_files/default.asp) was the source for trade and 
production data in order to construct the import penetration ratio.  Time series data over 1985-
2001 for farm products at the 4- and 5-digit Harmonized System (HS) level are available at  
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the site.
18  There is considerable time-series variation as well as cross-sectional variation in 
the data.   
Lobbying data were constructed as described in Section 3 from FEC databases for 
each election cycle between 1991 and 2000.
19  Goods are ordered by the of PAC spending-to-
production ratio.
 20  Agricultural protection is primarily measured as nontariff measure 
coverage ratios, or NTMs.
21  Data on the incidence of nontariff measures are from the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database for the years 1993, 1996, and 1999.
22  There are over 150 types 
of NTMs documented by UNCTAD, and the measure used here is simply the coverage ratio 
of the union of all NTMs.  This measure, though it aggregates price-type, quantity-type, and 
investigations-type of NTMs, each with different price-effects, has nevertheless been used in 
prominent studies of the political economy of trade protection (Trefler, 1993; Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay 2000; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999).  The TRAINS database also allow 
narrower NTM classifications such as Price NTMs (P) and threat NTMs (THR), 
                                                 
18  The USDA system is not originally kept at the HS level. The coding into HS was done manually 
from verbal description. They fit HS 4- or 5-digits descriptions almost perfectly. 
 
19  Numerous checks have been applied to the lobbying data constructed for this paper.  For example, 
the data are in close proximity to the numbers reported in Opensecrets (2002).  A detailed data 
appendix that describes steps in the construction of the PAC data is available from the author. 
 
20 Production value is not immediately available, since the PSD database keeps data in quantities, not 
values, and units of measurement are disparate across goods. But imports can be recovered by dividing 
the import-to-output ratio by imports (from UNCTAD, see below) in order to recover value of 
production.  Where imports are zero this method does not allow measurement of production, and those 
observations have to be dropped. Fortunately, imports are strictly zero for only few goods. 
 
21  Agricultural protection may be measured using ad valorem tariffs as well. Model (3) was also 
estimated using four tariffs measures are available. Three measures are from the UNCTAD TRAINS 
database at the 6-digit HS levels for 1993, 1996, and 1999.  They are an ad valorem measure, a 
specific tariff measure, and a tariff coverage measure.  The fourth measure is an ad valorem tariff 
measure from the International Trade Commission (ITC) database at the 8-digit HS level for 1997-
2001. Import-weighted averages of these tariffs were used to concord to the 4- and 5-digit HS level of 
the PSD goods at which the analysis is conducted.  While specific tariffs are well explained by the 
model and reported in the tables, the ad valorem tariff data are not well explained by the variables 
included.  This is probably because tariffs have been determined multilaterally and are not appropriate 
for testing models of unilateral protection. The tariff results are available from the author. 
 
22  From the raw data on the UNCTAD TRAINS database,  Haveman has constructed binary indicators 
of NTMs at the 6 digit HS level.  These are used in the present analysis.  The TRAINS database does 
have some unresolved issues, some of which are corrected in more recent versions, but recent versions 
have only recent-dated NTM data.   
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countervailing duties (CVD), quality monitoring (QUAL) and specific tariffs (SPECT).  
Separate analyses of these NTMs are undertaken and reported. 
Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2003) have compiled data on the ad valorem equivalent 
of ad valorem and specific tariffs applied by the US on agricultural imports from the 
European Union on a set of agricultural commodities that also enjoy export subsidies in the 
US.   Whether these measures of protection are also associated with lobbying spending is also 
empirically investigated.  
Since NTM data are at the HS 6-digit level, they are readily merged with the trade and 
production data. The sample includes commodities that accounted for about 30% of total 
agricultural imports and 45% of total agricultural output in 1998. 
 
B.      Results 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates from a simple linear model with three explanatory variables, 
plus a constant term.  They are (i) the import-output ratio (M/Y), (ii) the export-output ratio 
(X/Y), and (iii) a measure of lobbying.  Two measures of lobbying, termed %PACEXP and 
RANKPACEXP, were constructed for each cross-sectional sample.  %PACEXP is PAC 
spending as a fraction of total PAC spending in the sample under consideration.  
RANKPACEXP is the rank of PAC spending (a high rank implies high PAC spending) scaled 
by sample size N.  So RANKPACEXP varies between 1/N and 1, and monotonically increases 
with PAC spending.  RANKPACEXP is less influenced by large values of PAC spending 
than %PACEXP, and so their estimated coefficients indicate robustness to these lobbying 
measures.  Six regression models are estimated here, two each for 1993, 1996 and 1999.  For 
the year 1993, the two models have M/Y and X/Y in common, but include either %PACEXP 
or RANKPACEXP.  The idea behind estimating the simple model is basically to discover 
whether lobby matters to non-tariff barrier protection of agriculture.    
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Table 2: Agricultural Trade Protection Regressions  − NTM I 
Year  Dep. Var.     Constant  M/Y  X/Y  %PACEXP RANKPACEXP  N  R
2 Adj.  R
2
1993 NTM  est  0.212  0.009   −0.270 2.694   31  0.267 0.185 
   t  1.981  0.599   −0.724 2.782        
1993 NTM  est   −0.084 0.013    −0.344  0.754  31  0.312 0.236 
   t   −0.518 0.932    −0.961   3.167      
1996 NTM  est  0.953  0.024   −0.445 0.425   33  0.292 0.219 
   t  12.226  1.613   −2.034 0.515        
1996 NTM  est  0.756  0.026   −0.468  0.408  33  0.391 0.328 
   t  6.538  1.914   −2.329   2.239      
1999 NTM  est  0.884  0.008   −0.265 0.644   38  0.161 0.087 
   t  9.436  0.395   −0.620 0.463        
1999 NTM  est  0.848  0.010   −0.303  0.114  38  0.164 0.090 
      t  6.443  0.498   −0.725    0.568         
1993 PRICE  est  0.092   −0.001 0.006 2.264    31  0.206 0.118 
   t  0.936   −0.089 0.018  2.553        
1993 PRICE  est   −0.130 0.003    −0.063  0.586  31  0.214 0.126 
   t   −0.852 0.193    −0.186   2.615      
1996 PRICE  est  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018    33  0.845 0.829 
   t   −2.327  0.048 0.018  12.444        
1996 PRICE  est  0.000  0.000   −0.001  0.001  33  0.107 0.014 
   t   −0.671 0.773    −0.770   1.695      
1999 PRICE  est  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.023    38  0.611 0.577 
   t   −1.903  0.044   −0.004 7.169        
1999 PRICE  est  0.000  0.000   −0.001  0.001  38  0.100 0.021 
      t   −0.502 0.939    −0.936    1.698         
1993 THREAT  est  0.015  0.004   −0.093 1.989   31  0.397 0.330 
   t  0.276 0.466    −0.487 4.012        
1993 THREAT  est   −0.019 0.008    −0.197  0.226  31  0.109 0.010 
   t   −0.183 0.848    −0.858  1.478       
1996 THREAT  est  0.993  0.023   −0.446  −1.872   33  0.312 0.241 
   t  12.014  1.510   −1.921  −2.138        
1996 THREAT  est  0.801  0.020   −0.379  0.229  33  0.232 0.152 
   t  5.732  1.214   −1.559  1.040       
1999 THREAT  est  0.938  0.008   −0.264  −2.335   38  0.182 0.110 
   t  9.527  0.363   −0.589  −1.599        
1999 THREAT  est  0.878  0.001   −0.125    −0.041 38  0.121 0.044 
      t  6.121  0.064   −0.274     −0.188         
Notes:   
1.  OLS estimates. Sample is cross-section of 5-digit HS agricultural products for 93, 96, 99. NTM data 
(from TRAINS database) available for those years. 
2.  NTM=Coverage of imports with some Price-type (PRICE), Quant-type or Threat NTM (THREAT). 
3.  Bold and underline implies that corresponding estimate is statistical significance at 5%, bold implies 
that corresponding estimate is statistical significance at 10%. 
4.  %PACEXP=PAC spending as a fraction of total PAC spending for the cross-section.  
RANKPACEXP=Ranking by PAC spending (high rank implies relatively high PAC spending) scaled 
by sample size (N is the highest rank).  So 1≥RANKPACEXP≥0 and monotonically increases with PAC 
spending.   
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The model estimates in the top panel of Table 2 clearly indicate that lobbying 
significantly influences the overall NTM coverage ratio. The bottom two panels of Table 2 
indicate that price NTMs (PRICE), which comprises a substantial part of the overall NTM 
coverage, might be driving the NTM results.  Threat NTMs (THREAT) produce conflicting 
results about the influence of lobbying.   
The quantitative implications of the estimates are considerable.  They indicate a 
sizable association of lobbying and the nontariff barrier measures.  Consider the 1993 NTM 
model with %PACEXP.  The coefficient of 2.694 shows that for every percentage point 
increase in %PACEXP, the NTM coverage ratio is associated with an increase of 0.027.  This 
is both an economically and statistically significant result.  The estimated coefficient of 0.754 
on RANKPACEXP in the second NTM model shows that the 1993 results are robust to the 
two lobbying measures.  The 1996 and 1999 NTM results are not as robust.  Whereas the 
coefficients in 1996 indicate an association between lobbying and NTMs, the other 
coefficients are not statistically significant.   
Quite surprisingly, the coefficients on M/Y and X/Y are not statistically significant in 
most NTM models for the 3 years.  The exceptions are in 1996, where an increase in the 
export-output ratio is associated with a lower NTM, as one would intuitively expect in 
industries with intra-industry trade driven by intermediates goods trade.  The import-output 
ratio is borderline statistically significant for the 1996 models, but not in the NTM models for 
other years.   
The second panel on Table 2 displays estimates from the price NTM models for the 3 
years.  The association of lobbying spending with PRICE (e.g. antidumping duties, 
countervailing duties and other price-oriented NTMs) is significant.  However, the 
coefficients fluctuate considerably across the 3 years.  For example, %PACEXP has a 
coefficient of 2.264 for 1993, but it drops to 0.018 and 0.023 in 1996 and 1999, respectively.  
However, the coefficients retain their statistical significance.  That points to the possibility 
that one or two large values of %PACEXP are determining the regression (which also 
explains why the fit for those years is abnormally good).  Even though RANKPACEXP is is 
less susceptible to influential data points, it produces the same inference, that lobbying is 
strongly associated with the imposition of price NTMs.  The drop in the estimates from 1993 
is also indicative of the fact that price NTMs dropped over this period according to the  
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Uruguay Round.  The third panel in Table 2 reports estimates from threat NTM models for the 
3 years.  Whereas in 1993 lobbying was associated with THREAT, there was no association 
in the other years.  Apparently, THREAT was lowered considerably after the inception of the 
Uruguay Round. 
  CVD and QUAL, however, did not reduce in frequency and intensity after the 
inception of the Uruguay Round.  This message is evident from the results in Table 3.  The 
top panel of Table 3 indicates that %PACEXP is strongly associated with the imposition of 
CVDs in all the three years.  However, the coefficient on RANKPACEXP is statistically 
insignificant indicating the possibility of influential %PACEXP values.  The bottom panel of 
Table 3 indicates that QUAL is significantly associated with lobbying spending and is robust 
across the two measures of lobbying.  The size of the coefficients on %PACEXP and 
RANKPACEXP also indicate that QUAL does not appear to have declined after the Uruaguay 
Round.   
Table 3: Agricultural Trade Protection Regressions  − NTM II 
Year  Dep. Var.     Constant  M/Y  X/Y  %PACEXP RANKPACEXP  N  R
2 Adj.  R
2
1993 CVD  est   −0.038   −0.007 0.191 1.997    31  0.378 0.309 
   t   −0.691   −0.987 0.997  4.026        
1993 CVD  est   −0.048   −0.003 0.080   0.183 31  0.054   −0.052
   t   −0.451   −0.341 0.341   1.180       
1996 CVD  est   −0.028   −0.008 0.117 2.155    33  0.395 0.333 
   t   −0.605   −0.881 0.885  4.331        
1996 CVD  est   −0.050   −0.002 0.031   0.201 33  0.064   −0.033
   t   −0.530   −0.200 0.193   1.360       
1999 CVD  est   −0.064   −0.015 0.320 2.778    38  0.288 0.225 
   t   −1.248   −1.352 1.362  3.634        
1999 CVD  est   −0.040   −0.007 0.154   0.140 38  0.045   −0.039
      t   −0.481   −0.582 0.577     1.096         
1993 QUAL  est  0.064  0.008   −0.225 2.728   31  0.514 0.460 
   t  1.049 0.992    −1.054 4.930        
1993 QUAL  est   −0.004 0.014    −0.362  0.348  31  0.187 0.096 
   t   −0.033 1.296    −1.326   1.917      
1996 QUAL  est   −0.006 0.000    −0.004 3.231   33  0.599 0.558 
   t   −0.123 0.018    −0.029 6.490        
1996 QUAL  est   −0.136 0.009    −0.135  0.489  33  0.252 0.175 
   t   −1.321 0.761    −0.756   3.020      
1999 QUAL  est   −0.022   −0.006 0.122 4.294    38  0.340 0.282 
   t   −0.318   −0.386 0.383  4.141        
1999 QUAL  est   −0.132 0.006    −0.135  0.498  38  0.222 0.153 
      t   −1.233 0.400    −0.397    3.062         
Notes:  1.   See note to Table 2.             2.  CVD=Countervailing Duties, QUAL=Quality Monitoring.  
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Table 4: Agricultural Trade Protection Regressions  − Specific Tariffs 
Year Dep. Var.     Constant M/Y  X/Y %PACEXP RANKPACEXP N  R
2 Adj.  R
2
1993 SPECT  est  0.232   −0.046 1.281 1.488   31  0.311 0.234
   t  2.058   −2.978 3.258 1.460        
1993 SPECT  est  0.049   −0.044 1.246  0.450  31  0.334 0.260
   t  0.285   −2.913 3.259   1.769      
1996 SPECT  est  0.261   −0.006 0.144 2.564   33  0.218 0.137
   t  2.820   −0.354 0.553 2.621        
1996 SPECT  est  0.064  0.001  0.036   0.567  33  0.192 0.109
   t  0.428 0.085  0.140   2.393      
1999 SPECT  est  0.242   −0.015 0.387 3.227   38  0.136 0.060
   t  2.248   −0.669 0.789 2.021        
1999 SPECT  est  0.083   −0.006 0.194  0.521  38  0.162 0.088
      t  0.557   −0.271 0.409    2.298         
Notes:  1.    See note to Table 2. 
2.  SPECT=Specific Tariff. 
 
Similar inferences may be drawn about specific tariffs (SPECT) from the estimates 
reported in Table 4.  The association of SPECT with lobbying spending is found for both 
%PACEXP and RANKPACEXP (except in 1993 when the coefficient on %PACEXP is 
borderline significant).  Curiously, in the 1993 models of SPECT, M/Y and X/Y have signs 
that are contrary to expectation.  For example, X/Y has a positive coefficient, implying that 
the higher is the export-output ratio, the higher is the specific tariff on that product.  It is 
likely that tariffs are protecting imports of similar products and thus promoting exports of 
those products. This is an instance of tariffs as export promotion, an idea that was set forth in 
Krugman (1984). 
  Table 5 uses data on agriculture tariffs on imports from the European Union for those 
goods that also benefited export subsidies in the US.  These data are from Hoekman, Ng, and 
Olarreaga (2002).
23  Specifically, Table 5 models the average US tariff (during 1995-1998) on 
products that also benefited from a US export subsidy.  The extra variable that appears in 
these models is the corresponding European Union average tariff (AVGEU15).  That variable 
is included in order to examine whether US tariffs retaliate against EU tariffs for these goods.  
The clearest inference from Table 5 is that lobbying spending, whether measured by 
%PACEXP or RANKPACEXP, is powerfully associated with the imposition of US tariffs on 
products whose exports are subsidized in the US.  This finding is robust for each of the four 
                                                 
23 I am grateful to Francis Ng for providing the data and its documentation.  
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years 1995-98.  Table 6 estimates the same set of models, but the dependent variable now is 
the maximum US tariff (over 1995-1998) for each of these products in the sample (e.g. 24 
industries in 1995).  The estimates from the models affirm the earlier findings, implying that 
the results are robust to whether we model the average US tariff or the maximum US tariff on 
these products.   
 
Table 5: Determinants of agricultural tariffs (incl. Specific Tariffs) on products with 
export subsidies 
Dependent Variable: Average Tariff between 1995 and 1998 




CEXP  N  R
2 Adj.  R
2
1995 AvgUS  est 0.008  −0.009 0.088 0.114 0.905    24  0.513  0.410 
   t   0.279 1.166 1.144 0.366  4.091       
1995 AvgUS  est  −0.025  −0.005 0.056 −0.323   0.187  24  0.321  0.178 
   t   0.541 0.620 0.609 0.889    2.574      
1996 AvgUS  est 0.052  −0.005 0.062 −0.443 1.067    26  0.416  0.304 
   t   2.126  0.914 0.837 2.486 3.667       
1996 AvgUS  est  −0.047  −0.005 0.076 −0.193   0.226  26  0.375  0.256 
   t   1.137 0.990 0.989 1.273    3.349      
1997 AvgUS  est 0.045  −0.005 0.074 −0.373 1.094    28  0.314  0.194 
   t   1.760  0.933 0.875 2.026 3.082       
1997 AvgUS  est  −0.038  −0.006 0.105 −0.158   0.195  28  0.275  0.149 
   t   0.859 1.188 1.182 0.998    2.788      
1998 AvgUS  est 0.030  −0.011 0.201 −0.394 1.104    30  0.370  0.270 
   t   1.240  1.692 1.650 2.312 3.234       
1998 AvgUS  est  −0.044  −0.011 0.210 −0.169   0.182  30  0.337  0.231 
      t   1.147  1.682 1.683 1.153    2.949          
 
Interestingly, the 1996, 1997, and 1998 tariff appear to be deterred by EU tariffs on 
these particular products.  The coefficient on Table 5 on AVGEU15 is ─0.443 for the year 
1996 in the model with %PACEXP included.  That indicates that a higher EU average tariff 
deterred the average US tariff.  While this is a somewhat surprising finding, it is not robust 
across the two models for each year.  With RANKPACEXP included, the coefficient on 
AVGEU15 becomes statistically insignificant.  It is quite possible that the most influential 
%PACEXP values are correlated with influential AVGEU15 values.  When influential values 
get lesser weight (as happens when RANKPACEXP is included), the correlation between the 
lobbying variable and AVGEU15 declines, and we get statistically insignificant results on  
  53
AVGEU15.  In sum, the coefficient on retaliation or deterrents is not robust across the years 
and across the models estimated.  This also holds true in Table 6 for the maximum US tariff.  
 
Table 6: Determinants of agricultural tariffs (incl. Specific tariffs) on products with 
export subsidies 
Dependent Variable: Maximum Tariff between 1995 and 1998 




ACEXP  N  R
2 Adj.  R
2
1995 MaxRateUS est  0.022  −0.010 0.101 −0.002 1.358    24  0.537  0.439 
   t   0.505 0.960 0.934 0.005  4.256       
1995 MaxRateUS est  −0.036  −0.008 0.077 −0.536  0.302  24  0.382  0.252 
   t   0.550 0.629 0.611 1.426    2.968      
1996 MaxRateUS est  0.077  −0.006 0.084 −0.507 1.785    26  0.464  0.362 
   t   2.220  0.878 0.796 3.186 4.089       
1996 MaxRateUS est  −0.083  −0.006 0.098 −0.239  0.370  26  0.428  0.319 
   t   1.384 0.887 0.891 1.837    3.782      
1997 MaxRateUS est  0.068  −0.007 0.112 −0.442 1.832    28  0.339  0.224 
   t   1.792  0.934 0.872 2.551 3.272       
1997 MaxRateUS est  −0.072  −0.010 0.157 −0.218  0.332  28  0.329  0.212 
   t   1.096 1.195 1.192 1.550    3.190      
1998 MaxRateUS est  0.044  −0.017 0.315 −0.468 1.860    30  0.399  0.303 
   t   1.213  1.775 1.731 2.946 3.527       
1998 MaxRateUS est  −0.077  −0.016 0.307 −0.224  0.302  30  0.374  0.274 
   t   1.345 1.648 1.652 1.717    3.304      
Notes:                      
Data Source: Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2004)             
 
  In sum, the econometric estimates point to two fairly strong associations from US data 
from the 1990s across agricultural products, and a fairly surprising non-association. The first 
strong association is that between lobbying spending by agricultural PACs and measures of 
nontariff barriers. This association is seen to be robust across aggregate NTMs as well NTMs 
disaggregated by type.  While there is no evidence of such an association with ad valorem 
tariffs, probably because they have been multilaterally lowered, lobbying is still associated 
with specific tariffs. The second strong association is that between the average US tariff 
(taken over the 1995-98 period) on those goods that also enjoy an export subsidy in the US 
and lobbying spending.  The surprising non-association is between the agricultural protection, 
however it is defined, and trade measures such as import penetration and export-to-output 
ratio.  If anything, the surprise is that it is not these variables, often the key issue variables in  
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empirical investigations of the political economy of protection, but rather direct measures of 
pressure like lobbying spending, that are strongly associated with agricultural protection. 
  While the econometric model used here is not in itself the appropriate vehicle to 
determine whether lobbying is payment for services or whether it influences protection 
through the channels of information provision by the lobbyist, the analysis of the data together 
with the survey of the literature suggests that lobbying in agriculture might be payment for 
services more than purely informational lobbying.  However, more theory based estimation is 
required before such a claim can be made conclusively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper has analyzed the structure of lobbying by agricultural PACs over the 1991-2000 
period.  A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by agricultural PACs 
indicates that (i) while many PACs exist, in most sectors the majority of contributions are 
made by very few PACs, that is, giving by PACs is highly concentrated, (ii) PAC 
contributions seem to be made with a view to gain access to politicians, but PACs respond by 
contributing more when such contributions might influence election outcomes, (iii) the top 20 
recipients among House candidates often consist of members of the Agriculture committee, 
(iv) the top 20 recipients among Senate candidates have fewer members of committees that 
are connected to agricultural policy, (v) the top House recipients of agricultural PAC money 
receive a significant portion of their total PAC receipts from agricultural PACs, which is 
probably a reason why they vie for positions on the Agriculture committee, (vi) the top Senate 
and House candidate receive about equal amounts from agricultural PACs.  In sum, PACs 
seem to be quite effective in influencing agriculture policy in the U.S.   
A reduced-form econometric model of agricultural protection provides clear evidence 
of a strong association of lobbying with protection. That evidence together with the graphical 
analysis, appears to demonstrate that PAC money wields a strong influence over agricultural 
protection.  Whether it is PAC money that is influential or whether PAC money primarily 
allows access to politicians so that PACs can then influence policy by supplying (costly) 
information that politicians find valuable in enhancing their future election chances, remains 
an open question worthy of further study.  It is hoped that this study encourages more 
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